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The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of
assignment games
Abstract: In this paper we prove that in the class of assignment games with a dominant
diagonal (Solymosi and Raghavan, 2001), Thompson’s fair division point (which is known
to be the τ-value) is the unique core allocation that is maximal with respect to the Lorenz
dominance relation and it coincides with the Dutta-Ray (1989) solution (or egalitarian so-
lution).
Secondly, strengthening the dominant diagonal condition, a new class of assignment
games is introduced where the profit obtained by each agent with her optimal partner is
at least twice as much as her potential profit with any other partner. For these assign-
ment games with a 2-dominant diagonal, Thompson’s fair division point is also the unique
element of the kernel, and thus the nucleolus.
Key words: assignment game, core, kernel, Lorenz domination
JEL: C71, C78
Resum: En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d’assignacio´ amb diagonal
dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb
el valor tau) e´s l’u´nic punt del core que e´s maximal respecte de la relacio´ de domina`ncia
de Lorenz, i a me´s coincideix amb la solucio´ de Dutta i Ray (1989), tambe´ coneguda com
solucio´ igualita`ria.
En segon lloc, mitjanc¸ant una condicio´ me´s forta que la de diagonal dominant, in-
troduı¨m una nova classe de jocs d’assignacio´ on cada agent obte´ amb la seva parella o`ptima
almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d’assignacio´ amb di-
agonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson e´s l’u´nic punt del kernel, i per tant el
nucleolo.
1 Introduction
Coalitional game theory aims to propose allocation rules that express some notion of fair-
ness or distributive justice in the division of the jointly obtained worth. Egalitarianism is
one notion of fairness and it is agreed that a least requirement to say a rule is egalitarian
is that it should be maximal according to the Lorenz criterion applied to some subset of
outcomes. See for instance Thomson (2011) for a recent application of Lorenz criterion to
the ranking of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims.
The set of Lorenz-maximal core allocations is analyzed as a solution concept for bal-
anced coalitional games in Hougaard et al. (2001) and Arin and In˜arra (2001), combining
core selection with egalitarianism as a standard of fairness. This solution is defined as the
subset of core allocations that are not Lorenz dominated by another core element.
Before Hougaard et al. (2001), Dutta and Ray (1989) propose a solution concept
responding to egalitarianism under participation constraints (core-like constraints). This
means to select an egalitarian (Lorenz-maximal) allocation among those that are not blocked
by any subcoalition, where the term “block” is used in the sense that the subcoalition can
find an allocation according to its egalitarian rule that makes all its members just as well
off, and some member strictly better off. Thus, by a recursive procedure, the Lorenz core
of each coalition is constructed and then the Lorenz-maximal allocation in the Lorenz core
of the grand coalition is the Dutta-Ray solution.
The nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is a single-valued solution concept for coalitional
games that responds to the Rawl’s egalitarian criterion applied not only to individuals but
to coalitions. According to Maschler et al. (1979), the nucleolus is fair in the sense that it
is “the result of an arbitrator’s desire to minimize the dissatisfaction of the most dissatis-
fied coalition”, where the dissatisfaction of a coalition at a payoff vector is the difference
between the worth of the coalition and its total payoff.
Sudho¨lter and Peleg (1998) apply the Lorenz criterion of egalitarianism over coalitions,
since they compare allocations by ordering their distributions of excesses by the Lorenz
domination, and find that the (pre)nucleolus is maximal in this Lorenz order. A general-
ization of this procedure in Arin and Feltkamp (2002) allows to see that the Shapley value
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also responds to some egalitarian criterion over coalitions.2
In the present paper we focus on a particular class of coalitional games that are the
assignment games and see that, under certain conditions, different notions of egalitarianism
lead to the same allocation rule. The idea of applying Lorenz dominance to the assignment
market was posed in Hougaard et al. (2001). More recently, Roth et al. (2005) address
distributive justice issues in some matching problems by means of Lorenz dominance.
In an assignment market agents are partitioned in two disjoint sets, let us say buyers and
sellers (or firms and workers) and when a member of one group is paired with a member
of the other group an additional value is created. From this situation, Shapley and Shubik
(1972) introduce a cooperative game where the worth that a coalition can attain is the ad-
dition of the values generated by all the pairs in an optimal matching. Since side-payments
are allowed, the problem is how to share among the agents the worth of an optimal match-
ing.
The first approach is to look for allocations of the total worth that no coalition can
improve upon. Shapley and Shubik prove that this is indeed possible (the core is non-
empty) and that to obtain a core allocation it is enough to exclude third-party payments
(that is, the paired agents must share exactly the value of their pairing) and impose pairwise
stability (in a core allocation no buyer-seller pair can produce together a value higher than
their actual join payoff). But the core of an assignment game rarely consists of a single
point. It is then necessary to select some core element under some criteria of fairness.
Thompson (1981) defines the “fair division point” as the midpoint between the core
allocation that is optimal for all the buyers and the one that is optimal for all the sellers.
Thus, it applies symmetry to solve the bargaining problem among the two sides of the
market, treated each side as a whole. This fair division point of Thompson is proved
in Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2002) to coincide with the τ-value, this being a solution concept
introduced by Tijs (1981) for arbitrary coalitional games.
On the other hand, Rochford (1984) assumes that each optimally assigned pair of indi-
viduals engage in a bargaining problem (a` la Nash) to determine how to distribute among
them the output of their partnership. Each pair is assumed to solve this bargaining problem
2See Arin (2007) for a survey on egalitarian allocation rules in coalitional games.
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invoking symmetry, the threats reflecting the other opportunities available in the market.
Then, the symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations are those core allocations z such
that all partners are in bargained equilibrium. This means that each optimally matched pair
splits equally what remains of their join value once each of them has taken her threat, that is,
the most she could gain in another partnership after her potential partner is paid according
to z. By Rochford (1984) and Driessen (1998), the set of symmetrically pairwise-bargained
allocations coincides with the kernel of the assignment game. But again, the kernel may not
reduce to a single point. An outstanding element of the kernel is the nucleolus (Schmeidler,
1969).
In fact, for assignment games, the aforementioned solution concepts are also known
to depend only on the core. That is, two assignment markets with the same core have the
same τ-value, the same kernel and the same nucleolus (Nu´n˜ez, 2004).
As a consequence of its definition, also the set of Lorenz-maximal core allocations
depends only on the core of the game and not on the characteristic function (the worth of
coalitions). This is the reason why Hougaard et al. (2001) say that it would be interesting
to study the Lorenz-maximal core allocations in assignment games.
It is immediate to realize that, for arbitrary coalitional games, when the allocation that
splits equally the worth of the grand coalition among the agents belongs to the core, then
it is the unique Lorenz-maximal core allocation. But for assignment games, this equal-
share allocation being in the core is quite restrictive, since it implies that in the market
all optimally matched pairs attain the same value. Instead, the allocation in which each
two optimally paired agents split equally the value of their partnership seems a natural
division to be considered in an assignment market, at least when it belongs to the core of
the assignment game.
In the class of assignment games with a dominant diagonal (Solymosi and Raghavan,
2001), it is known that the aforementioned allocation coincides with Thompson’s fair divi-
sion point, and thus it lies in the core. The aim of this paper is to analyze when this solution
to the assignment game fulfills as many standards of fairness as possible.
In Section 3 we find that, for square assignment games with a dominant diagonal (which
means that the join profit of any agent with her optimal partner is the most she could make
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with any other partner), Thompson’s fair division point not only belongs to the core but
also coincides with the Dutta-Ray solution, and moreover it Lorenz dominates all other
core allocations. In section 4 a class of assignment games is considered where the join
profit of any agent with her optimal partner is at least twice as much as her join profit in
any other partnership. We conclude that for this class of assignment games, which we name
2-dominant diagonal assignment games, although the core can be considerably ample, the
game is somehow “determined” since the kernel and the Lorenz-maximal core allocations
coincide and reduce to the nucleolus, which also coincides with Thompson’s fair division
point and the Dutta-Ray solution.
2 Definitions and notations
Let N = {1,2, ...,n} denote a finite set of players, and 2N the set of all possible coalitions
or subsets of N. The cardinality of coalition S is denoted by |S|. Given two coalitions S and
T , S ⊆ T denotes inclusion while S ⊂ T denotes strict inclusion.
A cooperative game in coalitional form (a game) is a pair (N,v), where v : 2N −→ R,
with v( /0) = 0, is the characteristic function which assigns to each coalition S the worth
v(S) it can attain. If no confusion arises, a game (N,v) is denoted by simply v.
Given a game (N,v), a payoff vector is x ∈RN , where xi stands for the payoff to player
i ∈ N. The restriction of a payoff vector x to a coalition S is denoted by x|S. Given two
payoff vectors x,y ∈ RN , we write y ≥ x if yi ≥ xi for all i ∈ N, and y > x whenever y ≥ x
and moreover there exists i ∈ N such that yi > xi. An imputation is a payoff vector x that
is efficient, ∑i∈N xi = v(N), and individually rational, xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N. The set of
all imputations of a game (N,v) is denoted by I(v), and when I(v) 6= /0 the game is said to
be essential. The excess of a coalition S at an imputation x ∈ I(v) is v(S)−∑i∈S xi.
A solution concept defined on the set of games with player set N is a rule that assigns to
each such game a subset of efficient payoff vectors. The best known set-solution concept
for coalitional games is the core. The core of the game is the set of payoff vectors that
are efficient and coalitionally rational, that is, ∑i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N. A game with a
non-empty core is a balanced game. Typically, the core of a game contains infinitely many
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payoff vectors. This forces to select some particular core allocation following some idea
of fairness. Among others, given a game (N,v), a well known single–valued core selection
is the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969). The nucleolus of a game (N,v) is the imputation
ν(v) that lexicographically minimizes, over the set of imputations, the vector of excesses
arranged in non-increasing order.
The kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965), is another set-solution concept for cooperative
games. The kernel, K (v), of an essential cooperative game (N,v) is always nonempty
and it contains the nucleolus. Thus, for balanced games, there always exist imputations in
the intersection of the core and the kernel which could be selected in front of other core
allocations if we agree with the standard of fairness that supports the kernel.
For zero–monotonic games,3 as it is the case of assignment games, the kernel can be
described by
K (v) = {z ∈ I(v) | svi j(z) = s
v
ji(z) for all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j} ,
where the maximum surplus svi j(z) of player i over another player j with respect to the
imputation z is defined by
svi j(z) = max
{
v(S)−∑
k∈S
zk
∣∣∣∣∣S ⊆ N , i ∈ S , j 6∈ S
}
.
We will just write si j(z) when no confusion regarding the game v can arise. Then, for
zero-monotonic games, the kernel can be viewed as those imputations for which any two
players are equally powerful concerning their mutual threats.
A different standard of fairness is that provided by the Lorenz domination. This bi-
nary relation compares payoff vectors by means of how evenly distributed are the agents’
payoffs, and is favorable to agents with lower payoffs. Formally, for any x ∈ RN , denote
by xˆ = (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn) the vector obtained from x by rearranging its coordinates in a non-
increasing order, that is, xˆ1≥ xˆ2≥ . . .≥ xˆn. For any two vectors y,x∈RN with y(N)= x(N),
we say that y weakly Lorenz dominates x, denoted by y L x, if ∑kj=1 yˆ j ≤ ∑kj=1 xˆ j, for all
k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. We say that y Lorenz dominates x, denoted by y ≻L x, if at least one of the
above inequalities is strict.
3A game (N,v) is zero-monotonic if for any pair of coalitions S,T , S ⊂ T ⊆ N it holds v(S) +
∑i∈T\S v({i})≤ v(T ).
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Given a subset of payoff vectors, A⊆RN , we denote by E(A) the set of Lorenz-maximal
elements in A, that is, E(A) = {x ∈ A | there is no y ∈ A such that y ≻L x}. If (N,v) is a
balanced game, Hougaard et al. (2001) and Arin and In˜arra (2001) propose the Lorenz-
maximal core elements, L(v) = E(C(v)), as a set-solution concept. Since C(v) is a non-
empty compact set, L(v) is non-empty.
But Dutta and Ray (1989) argue that if we pursue egalitarianism as standard of fairness,
we should not restrict to core allocations since an allocation outside the core is disregarded
because it is blocked by some viable coalition, but we do not require the blocking payoff
vector to be egalitarian (in the sense of Lorenz undomination) for the blocking coalition.
To this end, they define the Lorenz cores of coalitions. The Lorenz core of a singleton
coalition is L({i}) = {v(i)}. Now suppose that the Lorenz cores for all coalitions of cardi-
nality k or less have been defined, where 1 ≤ k < n. The Lorenz core of a coalition S ⊆ N
of cardinality k +1 is defined by
L(S) =
x ∈RS
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈S xi = v(S) and there is no T ⊂ S andy ∈ E(L(T )) such that y > x|T
 , (1)
where recall that y > x|T means that yi ≥ xi for all i ∈ T , with at least one of these inequali-
ties being strict. It follows from this definition that the Lorenz core of coalition N contains
the core: C(v)⊆ L(N).
Given (N,v) a game, the Dutta-Ray solution is DR(v) = E(L(N)). Duta and Ray (1989)
prove that DR(v) is either empty or a singleton. Moreover, for convex games,4 the Dutta-
Ray solution exists (an algorithm to calculate it is provided), it belongs to the core and
Lorenz dominates any other core allocation.
The assignment model
A two-sided assignment market (M,M′,A) is defined by a finite set of buyers M, a finite set
of sellers M′, and a nonnegative matrix A =
(
ai j
)
(i, j)∈M×M′ . The real number ai j represents
the profit obtained by the mixed-pair (i, j) ∈ M×M′ if they trade. Let us assume there are
|M|= m buyers and |M′|= m′ sellers, and n = m+m′ is the cardinality of N = M∪M′. Any
4A game (N,v) is convex if v(S)+ v(T)≤ v(S∪T )+ v(S∩T), for all S,T ⊆ N.
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subset R⊆M∪M′ defines a submarket (M∩R,M′∩R,A|R), where A|R is the restriction of
matrix A to the rows and columns that correspond to agents in R.
A matching µ ⊆ M×M′ between M and M′ is a bijection from M0 ⊆ M to M′0 ⊆ M′,
such that |M0| =
∣∣M′0∣∣ = min{|M| , |M′|} . We write (i, j) ∈ µ as well as j = µ (i) or i =
µ−1 ( j) . The set of all matchings is denoted by M (M,M′) . If m = m′, the assignment
market is said to be square.
A matching µ ∈ M (M,M′) is optimal for the assignment market (M,M′,A) if for
all µ ′ ∈ M (M,M′) we have ∑(i, j)∈µ ai j ≥ ∑(i, j)∈µ ′ ai j, and we denote the set of optimal
matchings by M ∗A (M,M′) .
Shapley and Shubik (1972) associate to any assignment market (M,M′,A) a cooperative
game in coalitional form, with player set N = M ∪M′ and characteristic function wA, de-
fined by: for S⊆M and T ⊆M′,wA (S∪T) = max
{
∑(i, j)∈µ ai j | µ ∈M (S,T )
}
, M (S,T)
being the set of matchings between S and T . The core of the assignment game is always
non-empty, and it is enough to impose coalitional rationality for one-player coalitions and
mixed-pair coalitions:
Core(wA) =
(u,v) ∈RM+ ×RM′+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈M ui +∑ j∈M′ v j = wA (N) ,ui + v j ≥ ai j, for all (i, j) ∈M×M′
 , (2)
where R+ stands for the set of non-negative real numbers. It follows from (2) that, if µ is
an optimal matching, unassigned agents receive zero payoff and, moreover,
if (i, j) ∈ µ then ui + v j = ai j. (3)
There exists a buyers-optimal core allocation, (u,v), where each buyer attains her max-
imum core payoff and each sellers his minimum one, and a sellers-optimal core allocation,
(u,v), with the converse situation. By Roth and Sotomayor (1990),
ui = wA(N)−wA(N \{i}) for all i ∈ M, and
v j = wA(N)−wA(N \{ j}) for all j ∈ M′.
Notice that, if µ is an arbitrary optimal matching of (M,M′,A), we obtain from (3) that
ui = aiµ(i)− vµ(i) for all i ∈ M assigned by µ and v j = aµ−1( j) j − uµ−1( j) for all j ∈ M′
assigned by µ , while agents unmatched by µ have a null minimum core payoff. The fair
division point is defined by Thompson (1981) as the midpoint between these two extreme
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core allocations, and it is proved in Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2002) to coincide with the τ-value5
of the assignment game:
τ(wA) =
1
2
(u,v)+
1
2
(u,v).
As for the kernel of assignment games, it turns out that it is always included in the
core, K (wA) ⊆C(wA), (Driessen, 1998). Moreover, if (u,v) ∈C(wA), then (i) si j(z) = 0
whenever i, j ∈M or i, j ∈M′, and (ii) if i ∈M and j ∈M′, then si j(z) is always attained at
the excess of some individual coalition or mixed–pair coalition:
si j(u,v) = max
k∈M′\{ j}
{−ui,aik−ui− vk}.
As a consequence, given (u,v)∈C(wA), we get that (u,v)∈K (wA) if and only if si j(u,v) =
s ji(u,v) for all (i, j) belonging to all the optimal matchings, since the remaining equalities
hold trivially (see Rochford, 1984).
All the solution concepts so far reviewed for the assignment game are tightly related to
the core, in the sense that two assignment games with the same core have the same τ-value,
the same kernel and the same nucleolus (Nu´n˜ez, 2004).
By adding dummy players, that is, null rows or columns in the assignment matrix, we
can assume from now on, and without loss of generality, that the number of sellers equals
the number of buyers, and in this way the assignment matrix is square. When necessary,
we denote the ith seller by i′, so that it can be distinguished from the ith buyer, which is
denoted by i.
A square assignment game is said to have a dominant diagonal (Solymosi and Ragha-
van, 2001) if, once fixed an optimal matching on the main diagonal, µ = {(i, i) | i ∈ M}, it
holds, for all i ∈M,
aii ≥ max{ai j,a ji}, for all j ∈M \{i}. (4)
This means that the matrix entries related to optimal pairs by µ are row and column max-
ima. If an assignment game has a dominant diagonal, then the payoff vectors ((aii)i∈M,0)∈
5The τ-value is a single-valued solution defined by Tijs (1981) for arbitrary coalitional games. It is a
compromise solution that may lie outside the core, although for assignment games it always selects a core
allocation.
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R
M ×RM
′ belongs to the core and thus it coincides with the buyers-optimal core alloca-
tion (u,v). Similarly, (u,v) = (0,(aii)i∈M) ∈ RM ×RM
′
. In fact, an assignment game has
a dominant diagonal if and only if the minimum core payoff of each agent is zero. As a
consequence, the property of having a dominant diagonal does not depend on the selected
optimal matching.
The class of assignment games with a dominant diagonal is a quite large class of as-
signment games that has specific properties such as the stability of the core, where we refer
to stability in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern.
3 Dominant diagonal assignment games and Lorenz-maximal
core allocations
The study of the Lorenz-maximal core allocations of the assignment game was posed in
Hougaard et al. (2001). For arbitrary assignment games, the set of Lorenz-maximal core
allocations may contain infinitely many points. The next example illustrates this situation.
Example 1. Let us consider a family of assignment markets with set of buyers M = {1,2},
set of sellers M′ = {1′,2′} and assignment matrices
Aε =
 1 1
0 1− ε

where 0 < ε < 12 .
For all 0 < ε < 12 , there exists only one optimal matching µ = {(1,1),(2,2)}. The core
is the triangle with vertices
A = (u,v) = (1,1− ε;0,0) ,B = (u,v) = (ε,0;1− ε,1− ε) and C = (1,0;0,1− ε),
and its projection to the space of the buyers’ payoffs is depicted in Figure 1
We claim that the set of Lorenz-maximal core allocations L(wA) is the segment with
extreme points
D =
(
1
2
,
1
2
− ε;
1
2
,
1
2
)
and E =
(
1+ ε
2
,
1− ε
2
;
1− ε
2
,
1− ε
2
)
.
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AB
C
D
E
H
I
J
Eλ
F
u1
u2
1
1− ε
Figure 1:
Notice that the upper extreme point E coincides with the Thompson’s fair division point.
To check that indeed L(wA) = [D,E], we will make use of a remark in Hougaard et al.
(2001) that is based on Theorem 108 in Hardy et al. (1934) and states that, when we ask
whether a payoff vector Lorenz dominates another payoff vector with its same efficiency
level, we can omit those components that are coincident for the two vectors. We then
proceed in four steps:
1. Let P = (u1,u2;1− u1,1− ε − u2), with 12 ≤ u1 ≤ 1 be an arbitrary point in the
segment [D,A], that is u2 = u1− ε . If P′ = (u′1,u2;1−u′1,1− ε −u2), with u1 < u′1,
is an arbitrary core element in the same horizontal line as P, we have that P ≻L P′,
since from u′1 > 12 we get u′1 > 1−u′1 and then apply the remark in Hougaard et al.
(2001).
2. Let Eλ =
(
λ , 1−ε2 ;1−λ , 1−ε2
)
, with 1+ε2 < λ ≤ 1, be a core element in the same
horizontal line as E. Any other core allocation in the same vertical line as Eλ is
Lorenz dominated by Eλ . Formally, if H = (λ ,u2;1−λ ,1− ε−u2) where 0≤ u2 ≤
λ − ε and u2 6= 1−ε2 , then Eλ Lorenz dominates H. To see this simply apply the
remark in Hougaard et al. (2001) and notice that (1−ε2 , 1−ε2 )≻L (u2,1− ε−u2) for
12
any 0≤ u2 ≤ λ − ε and u2 6= 1−ε2 .
Notice that a consequence of 1 and 2 is that the allocation E Lorenz dominates
all other core allocations in the convex hull of E, I, C and A. Moreover, from 1,
allocations in [D,E] Lorenz dominate those other in the triangle with vertices D, E
and J
3. An argument analogous to the previous one shows that D Lorenz dominates all the
core elements in the convex hull of D, B, F and C different from itself.
4. Finally, two different points in the segment [D,E] do not Lorenz dominate one an-
other. To this end, notice that an arbitrary point in this segment is
z(λ ) = λ
(
1
2
,
1
2
− ε;
1
2
,
1
2
)
+(1−λ )
(
1+ ε
2
,
1− ε
2
;
1− ε
2
,
1− ε
2
)
=
(
1
2
+
ε
2
(1−λ ), 1
2
−
ε
2
(1+λ ); 1
2
+
ε
2
(λ −1), 1
2
+
ε
2
(λ −1)
)
with 0≤ λ ≤ 1. Then, ẑ(λ )=
(1
2 +
ε
2(1−λ ), 12 + ε2(λ −1), 12 + ε2(λ −1), 12 − ε2(1+λ )
)
,
and notice that ẑ(λ )1 is a decreasing function of λ while ẑ(λ )1 + ẑ(λ )2 + ẑ(λ )3 =
3
2 +
ε
2(λ −1) is an increasing function of λ .
The main result in this section is that if the assignment game (M∪M′,wA) has a dom-
inant diagonal (see (4)), then the set of Lorenz-maximal core allocations reduces to only
one point. Moreover, this allocation will be proved to be the Thompson’s fair division point
(or the τ-value) and also the Dutta-Ray solution. Notice that the above example shows that
our first statement is tight in the sense that if the assignment matrix fails to have a domi-
nant diagonal, even if it is by an small amount ε > 0, then the set of Lorenz-maximal core
allocations may not be a singleton.
Theorem 2. Let (M ∪M′,wA) be a square assignment game with a dominant diagonal.
Then, the set of Lorenz-maximal core allocations L(wA) reduces to Thompson’s fair divi-
sion point τ(wA). Moreover, the Dutta-Ray solution exists and
L(wA) = {τ(wA)}= DR(wA).
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Proof. We assume, without loss of generality, that µ = {(1,1),(2,2), . . .,(m,m)} is op-
timal and a11 ≥ a22 ≥ . . . ≥ amm. Under the assumption of dominant diagonal, the op-
timal core allocations for each side of the market are (u,v) = ((aii)i∈M,0) and (u,v) =
(0,(aii)i∈M) and thus τ(wA)i = τ(wA)i′ = aii2 for all i ∈ M. To simplify notation, let us
write τ = τ(wA). Then, the vector obtained from τ by rearranging its coordinates in non-
increasing order is τ̂ =
(
a11
2 ,
a11
2 , . . . ,
amm
2 ,
amm
2
)
. In order to prove that τ is the unique Lorenz-
maximal core allocation we first prove that vector τ weakly Lorenz dominates every other
point in the core.
Let it be z =(u,v)∈C(wA). To see that τ̂1+· · ·+ τ̂i ≤ ẑ1+· · ·+ ẑi for all i∈{1,2, . . . ,2m},
let us first consider the case in which i is even, that is, i = 2k for some k ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m}.
Then,
τ̂1 + · · ·+ τ̂2k =
a11
2 +
a11
2 + · · ·+
akk
2 +
akk
2
= a11 + · · ·+akk
= u1 + v1 + · · ·+uk + vk
≤ ẑ1 + ẑ2 + · · ·+ ẑ2k−1 + ẑ2k,
(5)
where the last equality follows from (3) and the inequality from the definition of vector zˆ,
where z = (u,v).
Let us now consider the case in which i is odd. Notice that for i = 1, we have τ̂1 =
a11
2 ≤ ẑ1. Otherwise, if ẑ1 <
a11
2 , we have both u1 <
a11
2 and v1 <
a11
2 , which contradicts
z = (u,v) ∈C(wA).
For i = 2k +1 with k ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m−1}, from (5) it follows
τ̂1 + · · ·+ τ̂2k ≤ ẑ1 + . . .+ ẑ2k.
Assume
τ̂1 + · · ·+ τ̂2k + τ̂2k+1 > ẑ1 + . . .+ ẑ2k + ẑ2k+1. (6)
Then τ̂2k+1 > ẑ2k+1. On the other hand, again from (5) and the assumption that the market
is square, we have τ̂1 + · · ·+ τ̂2k+2 ≤ ẑ1 + · · ·+ ẑ2k+2. This last inequality, together with
(6), implies τ̂2k+2 ≤ ẑ2k+2. But then, since τ̂2k+1 = τ̂2k+2, we have τ̂2k+2 = τ̂2k+1 > ẑ2k+1 ≥
ẑ2k+2 ≥ τ̂2k+2, which is a contradiction. Hence, for all i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m} we have τ̂1 + · · ·+
τ̂i ≤ ẑ1 + · · ·+ ẑi, and we conclude that τ L z which means that τ(wA) is Lorenz-maximal
in the core.
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To show uniqueness, suppose there exists some other z = (u,v) ∈C(wA) such that τ̂ =
ẑ. Also, for our convenience, let us write τ = (τu,τv) ∈ RM ×RM′ , where, for all i ∈
{1,2, . . . ,m}, τui denotes the payoff to the ith buyer and τvi denotes the payoff to the ith
seller. Then, by the assumption τ̂ = ẑ, we have τ̂1 = a112 = ẑ1. Let us see that in fact
ẑ1 = u1. Otherwise ẑ1 = a112 > u1 and then v1 >
a11
2 , which implies ẑ1 >
a11
2 and this is a
contradiction. Thus, τu1 =
a11
2 = ẑ1 = u1. Since u1 + v1 = a11 and u1 =
a11
2 , we have v1 =
a11
2 = τ
v
1 . But then, τ̂3 = ẑ3 =
a22
2 . As before, if ẑ3 =
a22
2 > u2 then v2 >
a22
2 , which implies
ẑ3 >
a22
2 , that is a contradiction. Then, ẑ3 = u2 =
a22
2 and thus τ
u
2 = u2 and consequently
τv2 = v2. By repetition of the same argument, we obtain (τu,τv) = (u,v) = z and thus prove
that the Thompson’s fair division point is the unique Lorenz-maximal core allocation.
Let us now prove that, under the dominant diagonal assumption, Thompson’s fair divi-
sion point also coincides with the Dutta-Ray solution.
Let P = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sl} be the partition of N = M∪M′ defined as follows:
S1 = {i ∈ N | τi ≥ τk for all k ∈ N},
S2 = {i ∈ N \S1 | τi ≥ τk for all k ∈ N \S1},
.
.
.
Sl = {i ∈ N \ (S1∪· · ·∪Sl−1) | τi ≥ τk for all k ∈ N \ (S1∪· · ·∪Sl−1)}.
If l = 1, then τi = wA(N)|N| for all i ∈ N, and thus DR(wA) = {τ}. If l > 1, notice that, for all
k,r ∈ {1,2, . . . , l} and all i ∈ Sk and j ∈ Sr it holds:
a) if k = r, then τi = τ j (i.e. aii = a j j),
b) if k < r, then τi > τ j (i.e. aii > a j j),
c) the restriction of vector τ to coalition Sk is
(
wA(Sk)
|Sk| , . . . ,
wA(Sk)
|Sk|
)
.
To see statement c), notice that by its own definition and the dominant diagonal condition,
for all k ∈ {1,2, . . . , l}, Sk is composed of a subset of pairs in the optimal matching µ =
{(i, i) | i ∈ M}. Thus, the restriction of the optimal matching µ to Sk is optimal in the
submarket with set of agents Sk and as a consequence τi = aii2 =
wA(Sk)
|Sk| for all i ∈ Sk.
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Since τ ∈C(wA), we can guarantee that τ ∈ L(N). If τ were not the Dutta-Ray solution,
then there would exist z ∈ L(N) such that z≻L τ , that is to say
ẑ1 ≤ τ̂1 =
a11
2 ,
ẑ1 + ẑ2 ≤ τ̂1 + τ̂2 = a11,
· · · · · · · · ·
ẑ1 + ẑ2 + · · ·+ ẑ2m ≤ τ̂1 + τ̂2 + · · ·+ τ̂2m,
(7)
with at least one strict inequality.
Notice that, since τ and z are both efficient, if z j ≥ τ j for all j ∈ N then we would have
z = τ , in contradiction with z≻L τ . As a consequence, the set J = { j ∈N | z j < τ j}must be
non-empty. Take then q∗ = min{k ∈ {1,2, . . . , l} | J∩Sk 6= /0} and choose any j∗ ∈ J∩Sq∗ .
We claim that
z j ≤ τ j for all j ∈ Sq∗. (8)
Indeed, if q∗ = 1, for all j ∈ S1 it follows from (7) that z j ≤ ẑ1 ≤ τ̂1 = τ j. If q∗ > 1, from
z j ≤ τ j for all j ∈ S1 and the definition of j∗ and J we get z j = τ j for all j ∈ S1. Then, from
(7) we have zˆ|S1|+1 ≤ τˆ|S1|+1. The repetition of the same argument leads to z j = τ j for all
j ∈ S1∪· · ·∪Sq∗−1. Then, taking into account (7), a) and b) we obtain, for all j ∈ Sq∗ ,
z j ≤ zˆ|S1∪···∪Sq∗−1|+1 ≤ τˆ|S1∪···∪Sq∗−1|+1 = τ j.
So, let it be T = Sq∗ . Then, by c), τi = wA(T )|T | for all i ∈ T implies τ(T ) = wA(T ) and
together with τ ∈ C(wA) implies that τ|T belongs to the core of the subgame (T,wA|T ),
which is known to be included in the Lorenz-core of coalition T , that is, τ|T ∈C(wA|T )⊆
L(T ). But τ|T is the equal-split allocation of the subgame (T,wA|T ) and thus {τ|T} =
E(L(T )). Then, since τ j∗ > z j∗ , where j∗ ∈ T , and by (8) τi ≥ zi for all i ∈ T , we conclude
that z 6∈ L(N) and reach thus a contradiction. This means that τ is the Dutta-Ray solution
DR(wA) = {τ(wA)}.
It is known that, for arbitrary assignment games, the Dutta-Ray solution may not ex-
ist, since an example is provided in page 621 in Dutta and Ray (1989). Thus, under the
dominant diagonal assumption, not only the existence of the Dutta-Ray solution of the
assignment game is guaranteed, but we also obtain that it lies in the core. In this sense,
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the behavior of the Dutta-Ray solution in the class of assignment games with a dominant
diagonal resembles that in the class of convex games (it belongs to the core and Lorenz
dominates any other core allocation), although dominant diagonal assignment games are in
general far from being convex games.
From Theorem 2 we can also deduce a characterization of Thompson’s fair division
point for arbitrary assignment games. It is known from Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2009) that the
core of an arbitrary assignment game is the translation, by the vector (u,v) of minimum
core payoffs, of the core of another assignment game, say (M∪M′,wAe), that has a dom-
inant diagonal: C(wA) = {(u,v)}+C(wAe). The analogous translation property trivially
holds for Thompson’s fair division point: τ(wA) = (u,v)+ τ(wAe).
By Theorem 2, τ(wAe) is the unique Lorenz-maximal core allocation and the Dutta-
Ray solution of the game (M ∪M′,wAe). But this result cannot be translated to τ(wA)
since, as pointed out by Dutta and Ray (1989), the Lorenz domination is not preserved by
translation. However, we can say that τ(wA) is the unique core element that allocates in
an egalitarian way what remains of wA(M∪M′) after having paid the vector of minimum
rights (u,v).
More precisely, for any arbitrarily fixed vector m ∈ RN , let us define the m-Lorenz
domination in RN by: for all x,y ∈ RN , x ≻Lm y if and only if x−m ≻L y−m. Then, the
following corollary holds.
Corollary 3. Let (M ∪M′,wA) be a square assignment game, m = (u,v) the vector of
minimum core payoffs and τ(wA) the Thompson’s fair division point. Then, τ(wA) ≻Lm
(u,v) for all (u,v) ∈C(wA).
We have seen in this section that, for assignment games with a dominant diagonal, the
Thompson’s fair division point fulfills the fairness standards of the Dutta-Ray solution and
the Lorenz undomination. What about the standards represented by the kernel and the
nucleolus?
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4 The kernel of 2-dominant diagonal assignment games
Even in the case of assignment games with a dominant diagonal, the kernel may contain
infinitely many allocations. Take for instance a square glove market with m ≥ 2, where
the kernel is known to coincide with the core segment. In this example Thompson’s fair
division belongs to the kernel, but it is not difficult to find instances of assignment games
with a dominant diagonal and such that Thompson’s fair division point is not in the kernel.
Example 4. Let it be the 2×2 assignment game defined by the matrix
A =
 8 5
3 8
 .
The above market has a dominant diagonal but Thompson’s fair division point is τ(wA) =
(u1,u2;v1,v2) = (4,4;4,4) and does not belong to the kernel, since
s11′(τ(wA)) = max{−u1,a12−u1− v2}=−3,
s1′1(τ(wA)) = max{−v1,a21−u2− v1}=−4.
In fact, in this example, the kernel reduces to one point, K (wA) = {(413 ,3
2
3 ;3
2
3 ,4
1
3)}, and
as a consequence this is also the nucleolus of the game.
In Rochford (1984) the payoff vectors in the kernel of the assignment game are char-
acterized as the set of fixed points of a function defined in terms of the threats (which can
be interpreted as the bargaining ranges outside the core). An alternative characterization is
given in Driessen (1999) by applying Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem to a function defined
in terms of the length of bargaining ranges within the core. To obtain our result we need to
work a little on the function used in Driessen’s characterization.
Let (M∪M′,wA) be a square assignment game and Cu(wA) = {u∈RM | there exists z =
(u,v) ∈ C(wA)} be the projection of C(wA) to the set of the buyers’ payoffs. For each
u ∈Cu(wA) we denote by zu = (u,v) the unique element in C(wA) that projects to u. Then,
Cu(wA) is a complete lattice with respect to the usual order in RM, that is, given u,u′ ∈ RM,
u≤ u′ if and only if ui ≤ u′i for all i ∈ M.
Let us now consider the function f : Cu(wA) −→ Cu(wA) defined, for all u ∈ Cu(wA)
and all i ∈M, by
fi(u) = ui + 12
[
siµ(i)(zu)− sµ(i)i(zu)
]
, (9)
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where µ is an arbitrarily fixed optimal matching of (M,M′,A). Then, by Driessen (1999),
if z = (u,v) ∈C(wA), we have
z = (u,v) ∈K (wA) ⇔ f (u) = u.
If we assume, without loss of generality, that the optimal matching µ is placed on the main
diagonal, µ = {(i, i) | i ∈ M}, then we can write, for any z = (u,v) ∈C(wA),
sii′(z) = max
k∈M\{i}
{−ui,aik−ui− vk}=−ui + max
k∈M\{i}
{0,aik−akk +uk},
si′i(z) = max
k∈M\{i}
{−vi,aki−uk− vi}=−aii +ui + max
k∈M\{i}
{0,aki−uk}
and obtain, for any u ∈Cu(wA),
fi(u) = ui + 12 [sii′(zu)− si′i(zu)] (10)
=
1
2
aii−
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{0,aki−uk}+
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{0,aik−akk +uk}. (11)
It is not difficult to check (and it is left to the reader) that f is a non-decreasing function
on Cu(wA), with respect to the usual order on RM. Then, as a result of Tarski’s Fixed Point
Theorem6 the kernel K (wA) of the assignment game is a complete lattice.
Now, in order to guarantee the inclusion of Thompson’s fair division point in the kernel,
we strengthen the dominant diagonal condition.
Definition 5. A square assignment game (M∪M′,wA) is said to have a 2-dominant diag-
onal if and only if, once placed an optimal matching µ on the main diagonal, for all i ∈M,
it holds
aii ≥ 2max{ai j,a ji} for all j ∈M \{i}. (12)
If an optimal matching is placed on the main diagonal, a square assignment game has
a 2-dominant diagonal if and only if each agent achieves at least twice as much profit with
his optimal partner as with any other possible partner. Notice that, trivially, if an assign-
ment game has a 2-dominant diagonal, then it also has a dominant diagonal. Moreover,
6If (S,≤) is a complete lattice and f : S −→ S an increasing function, then, the set E of fixed points of f
is non-empty and (E,≤) is also a complete lattice.
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Definition 5 does not depend on the optimal matching µ that is placed on the diagonal.7
It is straightforward to see that if the assignment game has a 2-dominant diagonal, then
τ(wA) =
((
aii
2
)
i∈M ,
(
aii
2
)
i∈M
)
belongs to the kernel. Indeed, for all i ∈ M,
sii′(τ(wA)) = max
k∈M\{i}
{
−
aii
2
,aik−
aii
2
−
akk
2
}
=−
aii
2
,
si′i(τ(wA)) = max
k∈M\{i}
{
−
aii
2
,aki−
akk
2
−
aii
2
}
=−
aii
2
.
It turns out that, when the assignment game has a 2-dominant diagonal, then τ(wA) is
in fact the unique allocation in the kernel.
Theorem 6. Let (M∪M′,wA) be a square assignment game with a 2-dominant diagonal
and µ = {(i, i) | i ∈ M} an optimal matching. Then, the kernel reduces to Thompson’s fair
division point, that is
K (wA) =
{((aii
2
)
i∈M
,
(aii
2
)
i∈M
)}
.
Proof. Let it be z = (u,v) ∈ K (wA), 0 ∈ RM and a = (aii)i∈M ∈ RM . Then, 0 ≤ u ≤ a.
Besides, the fact that u is a fixed point of the function f defined in (9) implies f n(u) = u
for all n ≥ 1. Thus, since f is non-decreasing, we have f n(0) ≤ u ≤ f n(a) and we only
have to prove that both sequences { f n(0)}n≥1 and { f n(a)}n≥1 converge to
(
aii
2
)
i∈M.
Let us first consider the sequence { f n(0)}n≥1.
7We claim that if (M ∪M′,wA) has a 2-dominant diagonal with respect to µ and there exists another
optimal matching µ ′, then, for all i ∈ M, either µ(i) = µ ′(i) or aiµ(i) = 0. If L = {i ∈ M | µ(i) = µ ′(i)}
we can restrict to the submarket with set of agents (M \ L)∪ (M′ \ µ(L)). So, let us assume without loss
of generality that µ(i) 6= µ ′(i) for all i ∈ M. Let then be K = {i ∈ M | aiµ(i) = 0}. If K = M we are done.
Otherwise notice that from the dominant diagonal condition, we have ai j = 0 for all i ∈ K and j ∈ M′, and
ai j = 0 if j ∈ µ(K) and i ∈ M. As a consequence, the restrictions of µ and µ ′ to (M \K)×M′ are both
optimal matchings for the submarket (M \K,M′,A|(M\K)∪M′). But then, taking into account the 2-dominant
diagonal condition, we have
∑
i∈M\K
aiµ(i) ≥ 2 ∑
i∈M\K
aiµ ′(i) = 2 ∑
i∈M\K
aiµ(i),
which implies that aiµ(i) = 0 for all i ∈M \K, in contradiction with K 6= M. Once proved the claim it easily
follows that (M∪M′,wA) also has a 2-dominant diagonal with respect to µ ′.
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Notice that for n = 1, by substitution in (11), and taking into account the 2-dominant
diagonal condition, we obtain, for all i ∈ M,
f 1i (0) =
aii
2
−
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{aki} ≥
aii
2
−
1
2
max
(l, j)∈M×M′
{al j}. (13)
Now we prove by induction on n≥ 2 that, for all i ∈ M,
f ni (0) =
aii
2
−
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aki− f n−1k (0)
}
, (14)
and
f ni (0)≥
aii
2
−
1
2n
max
(l, j)∈M×M′
{al j}. (15)
Let us first prove (14) and (15) for n = 2.
Again by substitution in (11),
f 2i (0) =
aii
2
−
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aki− f 1k (0)
}
+
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aik−akk + f 1k (0)
} (16)
=
aii
2
−
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aki− f 1k (0)
} (17)
where the second equality follows because the 2-dominant diagonal condition implies, for
all k ∈ M \{i},
aik−akk + f 1k (0) = aik−akk +
akk
2
−
1
2
max
l∈M\{k}
{alk} ≤ 0.
Moreover, for all i ∈M, from equation (17), (13) and the 2-dominant diagonal condition,
f 2i (0) =
aii
2
−
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aki− f 1k (0)
}
≥
aii
2
−
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aki−
akk
2
+
1
2
max
(l, j)∈M×M′
{al j}
}
≥
aii
2
−
1
22
max
(l, j)∈M×M′
{al j}.
Let us assume, by induction hypothesis, that, for all k ∈ M and all n ≥ 3, f n−1k (0) =
akk
2 −
1
2 maxl∈M\{k}
{
0,alk− f n−2l (0)
}
and f n−1k (0)≥ akk2 − 12n−1 max(l, j)∈M×M′{al j}. First,
for all i ∈M and taking into account the 2-dominant diagonal condition,
f ni (0) =
aii
2
−
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aki− f n−1k (0)
}
+
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aik−akk + f n−1k (0)
}
=
aii
2
−
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aki− f n−1k (0)
}
+
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aik−akk +
akk
2
−
1
2
max
l∈M\{k}
{
0,alk− f n−2l (0)
}}
=
aii
2
−
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aki− f n−1k (0)
}
.
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Notice that the above equation implies that f ni (0)≤ aii2 for all i ∈ M and all n≥ 3.
Also,
f ni (0) =
aii
2
−
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aki− f n−1k (0)
}
≥
aii
2
−
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aki−
akk
2
+
1
2n−1
max
(l, j)∈M×M′
{al j}
}
≥
aii
2
−
1
2n
max
(l, j)∈M×M′
{al j},
where the first inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the second one from
the 2-dominant diagonal condition.
Now, from aii2 −
1
2n max(l, j)∈M×M′{al j} ≤ f ni (0)≤ aii2 , for all n ≥ 1, it follows that, for
all i ∈M, limn→∞ f ni (0) = aii2 .
Let us now consider the sequence { f n(a)}n≥1. Similarly, making use of (11) and the
2-dominant diagonal condition, we prove that f 1i (a) = 12aii + 12 maxk∈M\{i}{aik} and, for
all n≥ 2,
f ni (a) =
aii
2
+
1
2
max
k∈M\{i}
{
0,aik−akk + f n−1k (a)
}
, (18)
and
f ni (a)≤
aii
2
+
1
2n
max
(l, j)∈M×M′
{al j}, (19)
and then deduce that, for all i ∈M, limn→∞ f ni (a) = aii2 .
Finally, from f ni (0)≤ ui ≤ f ni (a), taking limits as n goes to infinity, we obtain, for all
i ∈ M,
aii
2
= lim
n→∞
f ni (0)≤ ui ≤ lim
n→∞
f ni (a) =
aii
2
,
which implies ui = aii2 for all i ∈M.
The above result, that is, the reduction of the kernel to a single point, is tight in the
sense that it cannot be guaranteed for assignment games satisfying aii ≥ k max{ai j,a ji} for
all j ∈M \{i} and k < 2, being µ = {(i, i) | i ∈M} an optimal matching. This is shown by
the next example.
Example 7. Let us consider a family of assignment markets with set of buyers M = {1,2},
set of sellers M′ = {1′,2′} and, for each 0 < ε ≤ 8, assignment matrix
Aε =
 8 4
4+ ε 8
 .
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We show that in all these markets the kernel does not reduce to a unique point.
Let us see that the segment with extreme points B =
(
4− ε2 ,4;4+
ε
2 ,4
)
and C =
(
4,4+ ε2 ;4,4−
ε
2
)
is contained in the kernel. Let, for λ ∈ [0,1],
xλ =
(
4− ε
2
λ ,4+ ε
2
(1−λ );4+ ε
2
λ ,4− ε
2
(1−λ )
)
be an arbitrary element in this segment. Then,
s11′(xλ ) = max
{
−4+
ε
2
λ ,−4+ ε
2
}
=−4+
ε
2
,
s1′1(xλ ) = max
{
−4− ε
2
λ ,−4+ ε
2
}
=−4+ ε
2
.
and
s22′(xλ ) = max
{
−4− ε
2
(1−λ ),−4+ ε
2
}
=−4+ ε
2
,
s2′2(xλ ) = max
{
−4+ ε
2
(1−λ ),−4+ ε
2
}
=−4+ ε
2
,
which implies xλ ∈K (wA) for all λ ∈ [0,1]. Thus, the condition of 2-dominant diagonal
cannot be weakened and still guarantee the reduction of the kernel to a single point.
In fact, it can be proved that the kernel of the above example reduces to the segment
[B,C].
Since for all 0 < ε < 4 the above assignment game has a dominant diagonal, by Theo-
rem 2 the set of Lorenz-maximal core allocations reduces to the Thompson’s fair division
point that is (4,4;4,4) and does not belong to the kernel. Hence, this example also shows
that, for arbitrary assignment markets, L(wA) and K (wA) may be disjoint.
Let us remark to end this section that, for assignment games with a 2-dominant diago-
nal, it has been established in the paper (Theorems 2 and 6) that the best-known core-based
solutions, that is to say the kernel, the Lorenz-maximal core allocations, the nucleolus, the
Dutta-Ray solution and the τ-value recommend the same allocation, which is Thompson’s
fair division point. Thus, for this class of assignment games the Thompson’s fair division
is supported by the different standards of fairness of all these game-theoretical solutions.
Corollary 8. Let (M∪M′,wA) be a square assignment game with a 2-dominant diagonal.
Then
L(wA) = K (wA) = {ν(wA)}= {τ(wA)}= DR(wA).
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5 Concluding remarks
In the first part of the paper (Section 3) we have proved that, for those assignment games
with a dominant diagonal, the Thompson’s fair division is the unique Lorenz-maximal core
allocation and coincides with the Dutta-Ray solution. The proof relies on the fact that, as
a consequence of the dominant diagonal assumption, Thompson’s fair division point is the
allocation where, given an optimal matching µ , each pair optimally matched by µ shares
equally the join profit achieved, that is, ui = vµ(i) = aiµ(i)2 for all i ∈ M, and this payoff
vector lies in the core.
But there are instances where this allocation
((
aiµ(i)
2
)
i∈M
,
(
aiµ(i)
2
)
i∈M
)
also lies in the
core, although the assignment game does not have a dominant diagonal. In these cases, the
same proof as in Theorem 2 guarantees that this is the unique Lorenz-maximal core allo-
cation and coincides with the Dutta-Ray solution, but may not coincide with Thompson’s
fair division point.
This is the situation in the following example with set of buyers M = {1,2}, set of
sellers M′ = {1′,2′}, and assignment matrix
A =
 9 8
7 7
 .
There is only one optimal matching, µ = {(1,1′),(2,2′)} and notice that the market does
not have a dominant diagonal. Thompson’s fair division point is τ(wA) = (5,312 ;4,3
1
2). The
allocation where each optimal pair shares equally the achieved profit is (412 ,3
1
2 ;4
1
2 ,3
1
2) and
it can be checked that it belongs to the core. Thus, the Dutta-Ray solution is DR(wA) =
{(412 ,3
1
2 ;4
1
2 ,3
1
2)}, that differs from Thompson’s fair division point. Notice that this exam-
ple also shows that, for arbitrary assignment games, Thompson’s fair division point need
not be a Lorenz-maximal core allocation: in this example DR(wA)≻L τ(wA).
However, by Corollary 3 we know that if we subtract the vector of minimum core pay-
offs, m = (u,v) = (1,0;0,0), from both allocations, then τ(wA)−(u,v)≻L DR(wA)−(u,v),
that is, τ(wA)≻Lm DR(wA). In this sense, and in the case of arbitrary assignment markets,
some egalitarian principle, once the minimal rights have been paid, supports Thompson’s
fair division point.
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